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The research agendas of psychologists and economists now have several overlaps, with behavioural 
economics providing theoretical and experimental study of the relationship between behaviour and 
choice, and hedonic psychology discussing appropriate measures of outcomes of choice in terms of 
overall utility or life satisfaction. Here we model the relationship between values (understood as 
principles guiding behaviour), choices and their final outcomes in terms of life satisfaction, and use 
data from the BHPS to assess whether our ideas on what is important in life (individual values) are 
broadly connected to what we experience as important in our lives (life satisfaction).  
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Background 
This paper provides a first contribution to a research agenda aiming to investigate the complex 
relationships existing between values, behaviour and the outcomes of choices. We are interested in 
exploring whether and how values relate to choice outcomes, and here we begin by treating 
behaviour as a black box: we simply concentrate on values (which we assume to be antecedents of 
behaviour) and outcomes (which we assume to coincide with life satisfaction) (Kahneman, 2000; 
Kahneman, et al, 1999) and use empirical evidence to make a variety of hypotheses that we hope 
will help guide further research. 
The effect that values have on behaviour and outcomes has not been normally the focus of 
economists, who tend to rely purely on the outcomes of choices, and research on life satisfaction 
aiming to influence policy has implicitly relied on similar assumptions: for example, having 
observed that social activities increase overall life satisfaction, it is suggested that policy should 
increase time available for social activities and expected that people will take them up. This 
assumes either that values are perfectly aligned with what works best (complete consistency) or 
alternatively that these do not matter at all in determining behaviour which simply follows what 
works best (complete pragmatism). However, a key contribution of behavioural economics has been 
to show that preferences are reference dependent and loss averse, that is the carriers of utility are 
not evaluated states of wealth but rather gains and losses, with losses looming larger than gains (for 
an overview see Altman, 2006). Choice has also been shown to depend on the description and 
interpretation of decision problems, so that framing effects are present (Kahnemann and Tversky, 
2000). This questions several assumptions regarding the theoretical construct of preferences and 
their relation to choice in rational choice theory, and widens the discussion to account for values, 
beliefs and attitudes formation.  
Values have featured somewhat laterally in the literature studying the causes and correlates of life 
satisfaction (for an extensive recent review see Dolan et al 2008): most studies tend to concentrate 
on using measures of life satisfaction as the dependent variable and model the effects of various 
observable (demographic, socio-economic) and unobservable (such as personality) rather than 
specific values which have rather been assumed to be ‘packages’ associated with specific religious 
beliefs. The macro literature on national differences in life satisfaction refers to value systems using 
  1broad concepts such as Hofstede’s culture dimensions to explain observed differences between 
nations (Diener et al, 1999).  
Our paper aims to address the connection between individual specific values and life satisfaction 
and asks to what extent what individuals say is important in life (a proxy for their values system) 
also corresponds to what is important in their overall life satisfaction. Is it true for example that if I 
say that my job is very important to me satisfaction with my job will also be very important in my 
overall life satisfaction? And will I take action according to the former (my belief that it is 
important) or the latter (the fact that satisfaction with my job increases my overall life satisfaction)?  
 
In what follows we present a basic model of life satisfaction incorporating the basic assumptions of 
hedonic psychology work (Kahnemann, Diener and Swartz, 1999; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) 
and along the lines of Rayo and Becker (2007). We then focus on the relationship between values 
and life satisfaction and use data from the British Household Panel Survey to test with different 
methods whether the importance given to different life dimensions corresponds to their importance 
in overall life satisfaction. In sum, the paper asks whether we are getting it right both as individuals 
(are outcomes of our choices aligned with our stated values?) and as researchers (are we 
recommending policies that are going to work in practice through individual responses?) 
 
 
Life satisfaction and utility 
 
Much of the discussion in the literature on life satisfaction (or well being or happiness, which for 
the purposes of this paper are used interchangeably) has focussed on whether the latter does or does 
not provide a measure for utility: Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue that life satisfaction 
measures an individual’s perceptions of their experiences and not their utility as economists 
conceive it. However, they also report that, notwithstanding the existence of biases in retrospective 
evaluations (difference between experienced utility and remembered utility), the evidence suggests 
that choices are affected by remembered utility and not the profile of remembered experiences, 
which provides strength to the argument that life satisfaction analyses should be taken seriously for 
policy purposes (as in Layard, 2006). Clark et al (2008) present a thorough discussion of how 
happiness fulfils the requirements of utility of being a guide to individual choice (maximising the 
expected value of utility) and also a measure of the outcome of choice and chance factors not 
controlled by the individual but taken into account when making the decision. A key question our 
paper addresses is whether there are any differences between using values or life satisfaction as 
criteria for guiding choice, and what the empirical evidence on a sample of British households 
suggests they do. 
The relationship between life satisfaction and choice is modelled by Rayo and Becker (2007) in the 
framework of agency theory, with agents using life satisfaction as a decision-making device to rank 
alternative options. When choosing, agents in their model face constraints on their perception 
sensitivity when ranking alternative choices and the values of life satisfaction are also bounded, 
which implies that they evaluate options in relation to each other, rather than in absolute terms. This 
leads agents’ happiness to depend on the difference between their output and an endogenous 
reference point (ibid. p.306), which in turn is updated over time (through habituation and social 
comparison) producing the observed long term stability of mean happiness levels observed in the 
literature. Habit formation, peer comparison, prior expectations and the long-term mean stability of 
happiness are interpreted in this model as biologically founded traits which lead to evolutionary 
efficiency, and the evolutionary trial and error process itself is the model’s principal. 
 
Here we argue with Rayo and Becker, Kahnemann, and along the lines of hedonic psychology work 
(Kahnemann, Diener and Swartz, 1999) that life satisfaction is indeed a measure of a state of mind 
post-choice, but one that reflects the discrepancy between desired and experienced utility, and can 
  2be expressed as a function, which we do not normally know and make assumptions on, of the 
difference between the two, so that the relationship between life satisfaction and utility takes the 
following form: 
 
Life satisfaction = f (Desired U, Actual U, Desired U – Actual U)  (Eq1) 
 
This has a number of consequences, the most important of which is that subjective evaluations 
come into play in both Actual U and Desired U, and that choice may or may not be able to close the 
gap between them. The quest for happiness is precisely that of bringing reality closer to one’s 
dreams, with different constraints operating at the actual (e.g. income) and desired (e.g. desire to 
conform to role expectations) level.  
Adaptation and social comparison operate on this difference in different directions: the first brings 
desired and actual utility closer to each other making people happier with the status quo and 
therefore decreasing gains in happiness from changing it. The second can either bring them together 
or drive them apart, depending on the lot of the relevant reference group and on personality. Thus it 
is found, for instance, that over a longer period disabled individuals do not have significantly lower 
life satisfaction than those who have no disability (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), and the 
unemployed are likely to have higher life satisfaction when regional unemployment is high because 
they are less likely to interpret their unemployment as a personal failure (Kalyuzhnova and 
Kambhampati, 2008; Clark and Oswald, 1994). Individual effects have been analysed at the panel 
level by Clark and Oswald (2002), who have decomposed fixed effects on General Health 
Questionnaire happiness scores (rather than overall life satisfaction) across the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS, see for information UK Data Archive). Personality differences may also 
affect the individual propensity for comparison (see Ash and Dowling, 2007).  
On the basis of a rational action model, we argue that desired utility can be described as preferences 
or values: this is simply equivalent to saying that we aspire to realise certain goals dictated by what 
we believe in, under a variety of external (e.g. income) and internal (e.g. psychological factors) 
constraints. Further to this, we expect that values are relatively sticky, that is they hold stable for 
longer periods of time than actual utility happiness does, given that the latter varies with a number 
of constantly changing individual circumstances.  
We propose that it is possible to obtain estimates of desired utility (through values proxies), and of 
happiness (through self reported life satisfaction scores), but that actual utility cannot be measured 
directly and possibly not derived through equation 1 either, as the function linking them is 
individual (adaptation and social comparison propensities may be individual, as shown by Ash and 
Dowling, 2007). This does not diminish the importance of measuring and using happiness scores to 
inform public policy, but it opens interesting questions as to what welfare maximizing policy 
makers should do: if they aim to maximize happiness they may want to for example address the 
happiness consequences of the gender pay gap and the unequal division of domestic labour by 
promoting machist values persuading women that it is right for them to be paid less than men and 
do all the housework, thereby increasing their adaptation and their happiness. 
Conversely, the capability approach (see Nussbaum, 2000) favoured by feminist economists 
suggests that policy makers ought to maximize actual utility, that is remove constraints to the 
realization of individual potential (as well as address values). In practice, the effect on overall 
happiness scores of the two approaches may be the same, but in capabilities or actual utility terms 








  3Life dimensions, values and life satisfaction 
 
As life satisfaction is observed and measured in different life dimensions (health, job, social life, 
etc.), we assume that that the generic functional form linking desired and actual utility in n different 
life dimensions is the same as the one that links them overall. This hypothesis does not appear to be 
too restrictive for the moment, as it simply states that the way in which satisfaction is obtained, 
once desires and experience are considered, is the same across life domains which seems consistent 
with studies of the physiological processes associated with the computation of utility (Ito and 
Cacioppo, 1999). We thus re-write equation 1 as: 
 
Life satisfaction Ln = f (Desired ULn, Actual ULn, Desired ULn – Actual ULn)   (Eq2) 
 
 
We assume that the desired relative utility from different life dimension is captured by the relative 
importance attributed to the same life dimension (a proxy for people’s values), and thus can re-write 
Equation 2 as: 
 
Life satisfaction Ln = f (ImpLn, Actual ULn, ImpLn – Actual ULn)   (Eq3) 
 
 
In what follows we firstly assess the relationship between values and life satisfaction in different 
life dimensions, and then turn to the problem of aggregating dimensions into overall life 
satisfaction. We use data from the British Household Panel Survey, specifically information from 
the year 1998 (wave 8), which contains information from 10,548 respondents over 16 years of age 
from 5939 households. Wave 8 is appropriate to our study since it contains specific questions 
relating to the importance of different life dimensions, as well as the level of satisfaction with them. 
Wave 8 provides us with information on overall life satisfaction, on a group of life dimensions 
(health, income, house, partner, job, social life, and amount and use of leisure time) as well as on 
the relative importance of some of the same life dimensions (list imp variables), but not all. 
In what follows we consider life satisfaction scores as proxies for happiness and scores on what 
people say is important as proxies for desired utility. We firstly investigate their relationship to find 
the life dimensions in which the two measures are further apart. Then we make simplifying (but 
consistent with preferences aggregation theory) assumptions on the functional form in equation 1 
and assess the importance of these dimensions in overall life satisfaction. In doing so, we want to 
see whether we are ‘getting it right’: are our values broadly consistent with what makes us happy or 
not? In the final section of the paper we discuss why this matters from a theoretical and policy 
perspective. 
 
Table 1 below presents life dimensions ranked in decreasing importance by average scores across 
respondents and contrasts them with the means of life satisfaction in the same life domains. In 
doing this exercise, we are implicitly assuming that when asked to rank the importance of a life 
dimension in the context of a series of questions on several life dimensions respondents implicitly 
rank the options relative to each other, and they do the same when awarding life satisfaction scores 
to those dimensions.As can be seen, health, social life and to a lesser extent job are all providing 
relatively lower satisfaction than aspired to (as indicated by their relative importance), whilst house 
and partner provide relatively higher life satisfaction. Income appears to be the only dimension in 
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Health 9.55  1 5.10 3 -2
Social 9.26  2 5.05 4  -2
Partner 9.09  3 6.27 1  2
Job 7.91  4 5.04 5  -1
House 7.69  5 5.45 2 3
Income 6.40 6 4.59 6  0
 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for the observed discrepancies: they may be connected 
to questionnaire design (i.e. the context in which the questions are asked); they may also indicate 
that respondents always lie about what is important and about how happy they are with various 
aspects of life. In both these first two cases we cannot infer much from our results, so let us accept 
that the questionnaire is well designed and that respondents are not systematically lying. 
What we find indicates that there may be difficulties in realising one’s aspirations in some domains, 
either because of actual large differences between ideal and actual situations or a difficulty in 
adaptation: are our health and social life never really very good or are we being unrealistic in our 
expectations of them? Conversely, our houses and partners appear to be doing better than we would 
expect them to: are our dwellings and relationships surprisingly better than we think or are we 
happy to get by with what we have found? In other words: are our values regarding life dimensions 
more or less aligned with the outcomes of our (constrained) decisions? 
To address this question we now turn to the role of different life dimensions in overall life 
satisfaction: if we find that the dimensions on which discrepancies between actual and desired 
utility are high (or in which adaptation is low) are also very important to overall life satisfaction this 
may provide further evidence of non-alignment, if we find the opposite we may conclude that we 
are broadly getting it right. 
 
Life dimensions and life satisfaction 
 
We pose the relationship between overall life satisfaction and satisfaction with different life 
dimensions as in Lancaster’s theory of consumer utility, according to which the overall utility 
achieved consuming a good depends on the utilities associated with the different good’s 
characteristics (Lancaster, 1966). We thus suggest that people aggregate up their satisfaction with 
various dimensions of life in an overall life satisfaction index. We assume for the moment that 
individuals add these dimensions linearly, and as we do not know whether we have all the 
components of life that provide overall life satisfaction and as these may vary between individuals, 
we assume that in our sample overall life satisfaction for an individual i can be written as: 
 
Lifesati = αi1L1 + αi1L1 + …..+ αiNLN + εi  (Eq4) 
 
Where Ln indicates satisfaction with a particular dimension of life (e.g. health) and measures the 
difference between the actual and the desired situation in that particular life dimension, αi1 indicates 
the relative importance of this dimension to the individual, and εi is an error term capturing all the 
other dimensions the individual values in their overall life satisfaction for which we have no 
information. We now estimate equation 4 above in our sample to obtain the average weights an,  and 
  5the individual residuals ei.. The ranks resulting from the ordered probit estimation of overall life 
satisfaction are reported in table 2 below, in the first column labelled Ran.  
Table 2 below shows us that when considering the weight given to satisfaction with a particular life 
dimension in overall satisfaction some of the discrepancies between desired utility (values) and life 
satisfaction decrease in magnitude (see column 3 below), so that when looking at the discrepancies 
between weights and values (column 5 below) we find that on average across our sample income is 
the life dimension on which we are less ‘aligned’: our sample’s values suggest people give income 
less importance than it actually has in determining overall life satisfaction, as they do to a lesser 
extent with  respect to social life and house. Conversely, partners and jobs have lower weights in 
overall life satisfaction than in people’s values. 
  






























Rµ(ImpLn) - Ran 
Partner 5  1  -4 2 -2
Job 6  5  -1 -1 -2
Social 1  4  3 -2 1
Health 2  3  1 -2 -1
Income 3  6  3 0 3
House 4  2  -2 3 1
 
So what does this tell us? It suggests that values and outcomes are not very well aligned (we don’t 
get it right very much). What does this mean for policy? If people us relative happiness scores to 
guide their behaviour (a la Layard and Clark et al), should more time be made available to them to 
spend as they wish they would probably spend it searching for higher incomes, nicer houses and 
socialising. Conversely, if they behave according to values they will work more and spend more 
time with their partners. This clearly leaves us needing to understand more about the incentives 



















  6Individual effects 
 
Estimating equation 4 allows us also to obtain individual residuals, which we can use to see the 
relationship between individual characteristics and the discrepancy between values and life 
satisfaction. Table 3 below reports results of modelling the residuals of our ordered probit of overall 
life satisfaction on a series of correlates of happiness commonly used in the literature. Coefficients 
in bold are significant. 
 
 
Table 3: residuals regression 
   Coeff.  Std.Err.  t-ratio  P-value 
  ONE  0.632  0.011 59.801  0.000 
Sex of respondent  HSEX  -0.004 0.005  -0.812 0.417 
Race of respondent: white or other  WHITE  -0.001 0.010  -0.127 0.899 
Whether respondent has disability  DISABLED 0.020 0.023 0.867 0.386 
Whether respondent married  MARRIED  0.017  0.005 3.611 0.000 
Whether respondent jointly 
responsible with partner for 
childcare  JOINRESP  -0.030  0.008 -3.708  0.000 
Whether childcare done by others  OTHRESP  -0.042 0.038  -1.114 0.265 
Whether respondent holds any 
qualifications  NOQUAL  0.040  0.007 5.495 0.000 
Whether respondent holds 
university education or not  UNIVEDU  -0.009  0.005  -1.803  0.071 
Whether employed or not  UNEMP  0.036 0.038 0.962 0.336 
Number of hours normally worked 
per  week  WORKHRS 0.000 0.000  -0.873 0.383 
Usual pay  HPAYU  0.000 0.000  -0.713 0.476 
Financial situation: doing all right  HFISITC2  -0.026  0.006 -4.735  0.000 
Trust others: most people can be 
trusted  TRUST1  0.000 0.005 0.051 0.959 
Talks to neighbours most days  HFRNA1  0.020  0.006 3.205 0.001 
Talks to neighbours once or twice a 
week  HFRNA2  0.001 0.006 0.199 0.842 
 
 
The variables we find correlating with our estimated discrepancy include: being married, being 
jointly responsible for childcare, not having qualifications, doing all right financially compared to 
previous year, and having regular contact with neighbours. Alas, most people in the sample have 
these characteristics, so does the discrepancy matter to individuals? Overall happiness scores are on 
average quite high (87% of the sample report being quite satisfied or more, and 80% are as satisfied 
or more than last year), which suggests that people are somehow dealing with the misalignment. 
One explanation may be that they simply experience cognitive dissonance as in Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982): that is they deploy strategies to validate their choices ex post that are relatively 
independent of the outcomes of their choices. There may be others: as stated at the outset, this is a 
modest attempt to address the relationship between values and outcomes, but one that has hopefully 
shown that more work needs to be done to understand it in order to improve both the 
microfoundations of economic models of human behaviour, and the effectiveness of the policy 
prescriptions that are derived from them. 
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